Considerable experimental and theoretical research has been carried out in an attempt to design an automated highway system that can provide more efficient utilization of the highways and at the same time be safer and more comfortable than the current highway system. Here we present a unified framework for carrying out safety callculations for the automated highway problem. We obtain sufficient conditions for a set of continuous controllers to be safe and use these conditions to design a discrete scheme that switches between them. Guarantees of safety for the closed loop, hybrid system follow by design.
Introduction
Automated Highway Systems (AHS) are viewed as an alternative t o increased congestion of the current highway system. Design of a fully automated highway is a very complex control problem. To manage the complexity of the design process a partially decentralized, hierarchical, hybirid control architecture was proposed [l] . Continuous feedback laws are used at the lower levels, to carry out tasks such as regulation and trajectory tracking for individual vehicles. The continuous controllers (are supervised at the higher level by discrete controllers that are responsible for coordinating the actions of neighboring vehicles. Unfortunately, conventional control tools are sometimes insufficient to fully analyze the subtle interaction between continuous and discrete dynamics.
The aspect of the AHS problem where the need for powerful hybrid control tools is more pressing is the issue of safety. One would like to be able to prove that a proposed design does not lead to serious accidents. Here we present is unified framework for designing safe hybrid controllers for an AHS. Our approach builds on the work of [2] .,?'he design is carried out in two phases. First, continuous controllers are designed using game theory to optimize the plant performance. As a corollary of the game theoretic design, requirements that the 'Research supported by the PATH program, Institute of Transportation Studies, U.C. Berkeley, under MOU-238. discrete controller needs to satisfy are established. This allows us to formulate and prove theorems that specify the conditions under which the safety of the closed loop system is guaranteed. The results obtained in this way are most closely related to those of [3] . Our approach allows us to use a more complicated vehicle model and consider the effect of collisions between vehicles that has been ignored so far.
To facilitate the presentation we will state the safety theorem for the hybrid scheme first and then proceed to specify the continuous controllers. We will start in Section 2 by presenting the vehicle model and the requirements that will be iinposed on the design. In Section 3 we state the safety theorem. The proof is based on a number of lemmas dealing with the operation of the continuous controllers. A design process that produces controllers satisfying; these lemmas is given in Section 4. Finally, in Section 5 we will highlight some of the subtle issues raised by our design.
Modeling; & Problem Statement 2.1 Underlying Assumptions
Our goal is to design a safe control scheme for automated highway operation that supports platooning. In the concept of platooning [l] vehicles travel in tightly spaced groups (with spacings of about 1 meter) in an attempt to increase the highway throughput. The basic underlying assumption is what constitutes a "safe" system. Our analysis will indicate that requiring that no collisions occur may be too restrictive in terms of efficiency, as it does not allow platoons t o join or spilt. Based on [4] unrealistic. This assumption allows us to ignore the internal dynamics of the platoon. As a consequence we will collapse the platoons for the purposes of safety and assume that they are all one vehicle long.
Discrete Model
Two distinct modes of operation exist in the platooning framework: the follower mode and the leader model. These tion protocols were designed to implement these maneuvers. Some assumptions were made t o simplify the design process: a platoon can only be engaged in one maneuver at a time and only free agents can change lane. The logical correctness of the proposed protocols (i.e. their effectiveness as transitions between the discrete states) was verified using automatic verification tools. Note that continuous controllers are needed to track the fixed points and execute the maneuvers. The verification was based on assumptions about the behavior of these continuous controllers. In this paper we will refine these assumptions and determine if and how they can be met.
Continuous Vehicle Model
Consider three vehicles moving along a single lane highway ( Figure 2 ). The problem we are interested in is the vehicle following problem: we assume no control over vehicle B and try to control vehicle A. Vehicle C will be used only in certain cases, to isolate the system A-B from the rest of the highway. Assume that the vehi- Note that the assumed sensor arrangement can provide full state measurements. The engine, tire and road conditions impose constraints on the evolution of the system which can be encoded by:
For highway opelation it is assumed that vehicles will not be allowed to go backwards, therefore wAin = wgzn = 0 will be used. wAax and w z a x will not appear in the safety calculations. We will assume wAaz = CO to simplify the analysis. Typical values for a&zn etc. can be found in [lo] .
Hybrid Maldel
There are four kinds of exogenous inputs that influence the system evolution: the jerk of Similarly, a collision between vehicles A and C at time TC and with relative velocity 6wc will result in a reset of the state'
zl(T:) := zl(Tc) -SVC and z 4 ( T $ ) := 5 4 ( T c ) +SWC.
In hybrid system terminology the collisions are discrete disturbances. We will be interested in situations where vehicle B and vehicle C can experience at most one collision with relative velocity at most w,. In this case the evolution of the :state can be described by the hybrid automaton of Figure 3 . The requirement that vehicle B does not go backward can be encoded by restricting the set of allowable disturbances to. O] 'Note that in the coordinate system defined above, the collisions imply that bug 5 0 and bvc 5 0. It will be assumed that safety takes precedence over the other two cost functions and comfort takes precedence over efficiency.
Safety Theorems 3.1 Background Lemmas
We now propose a hybrid control scheme and show that it can guarantee safety. The proof will be based on lemmas that concern the continuous part of the controller. They will be discussed further in Sections 4. The details of proofs can be found in [lo] . 
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Then vehicles A , B, C, D, E will not collide an [ti,tf).
Without loss of generality, ti = 0 will be assumed for all lemmas.
Safety Theorem
The following theorem states conditions on a discrete design and an interface to the laws discussed in the lemmas, such that the hybrid control scheme is safe. 
Then the A H S is safe.
The proof [lo] is based on an induction argument on the number of vehicles. Assumption 2 should be interpreted according to the communication protocol design of [7] . A maneuver involves at least two cooperating platoons. For a join/split both the joining/splitting platoon and the platoon being joined tolsplit from are involved. For a lane changelentrylexit the vehicle that is moving, a vehicle in the target lane (either D or E) and the vehicle in the lane adjacent to the target lane (F) are involved. The protocols do not require cooperation if some of these vehicles are missing. Assumption 1 of the theorem can be used to obtain an interface between the continuous and discrete controllers. Figure  5 gives a compact representation of the necessary conditions that this interface needs to satisfy. should be used as the safety criterion for the lead controller design. We therefore approach the problem as a zero sum dynamic game with cost 51. Consider the following candidate saddle strategy, ( U ; , d;): The safe set of initial conditions is defined by V' = {xo E XIJ1(zou;,d;) <_ O}. Figure 6 shows the boundary of Vr, for three values of x!. the higher surfaces correspond to smaller initial spacings x! (i.e. the safe set shrinks as x! decreases). By the definition of a saddle solution, any initial condition on or above these surfaces will not lead to a collision, provided U = U ; . The saddle solution also allows us to determine the class of safe controls Ul(zo), i.e. the controls for which an initial condition zo will not result in a crash. Let ~V L denote the boundary of VL and int(V') its interior in the induced topology of X as a subset of R4. Then, if zo E VL, U1(zo) is simply the set of controls for which U: is applied in the complement of int(VL). Clearly, ~1 ( z O ) = 0 i f z : "
E : x \ v~, .
We can now improve the design by considering passenger comfort and efficiency. We assume that an efficient 
Join & Split Controllers
The leader safety calculations indicate that, for most situations of interest, the fixed point for the follower operation is well outside the set VL. B and C will be achieved by the "one maneuver at a time" assumption of Theorem 1. The third alternative is also feasible and can in fact be used t o produce a completely collision free controller. We will not investigate it here as it requires substantial modification of the discrete control scheme. The final alternative is used in the follower design. Technological limitations (such as the range of the infrared communication device used to transmit XB information) make this alternative unattractive for joining and splitting.
Unfortunately, the reduction in disturbance is insufficient to allow collision free joining and splitting. The next step is to relax the safety requirement by allowing small relative velocity collisions. 
Decelerate & Lane Change Controllers
The calculations for the leader can also be used to design safe controllers for the lane change. follow by design from Lemma 1. The design is such that vehicles A, C and D are safe with respect to vehicles in both the origin and target lanes throughout the maneuver. Therefore the lane change can be safely aborted at any stage. Moreover, the monotonicity of the safe set with respect to 5 3 implies that occlusion of vehicles during a lane change does not affect safety.
Concluding Remarks
We presented the design of a hybrid vehicle controller for an AHS. We proved that, under certain assumptions, the proposed design guarantees that no high relative velocity collisions will occur. The conditions obtained by solving the game theoretic problems are sufficient and necessary in the sense of being tight. They are sufficient from the point of view of controller design: they state that if the designer ensures that the initial condition lies in the safe set Vi before controller U ; is invoked and that u i equals to the saddle input on X \ i n t ( x ) , then the closed loop hybrid design is guaranteed to be safe. They are necessary from the point of view of verification. 
